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IN ABORTION LITIGATION, IT’S THE  
FACTS THAT MATTER 
Caitlin E. Borgmann 
The undue burden standard has become a double standard in the 
evaluation of abortion restrictions.  Courts demand from plaintiffs 
fact-intensive proof that an abortion law causes harm.  Usually, plain-
tiffs must prove that the law will completely deny some women access 
to abortion, a difficult if not impossible task in many cases.  At the 
same time, courts are highly deferential to the states’ own fact-based 
assertions about why these laws are needed.  If states simply assert 
that laws are intended to protect women’s health, keep women in-
formed of their options, or protect the integrity of the medical profes-
sion, for example, courts tend to agree, with minimal further inquiry.  
As a result, the country is replete with onerous, factually unjustified 
abortion laws. 
When legislatures target controversial rights or unpopular groups, 
courts should look beyond the nature of the asserted government inter-
est and closely examine the factual bases supposedly undergirding 
these laws.  This is because thorough, unbiased factfinding often takes 
a back seat in these cases.  For years, bans on marriages between 
same-sex couples were defended in part on the assertion that children 
are harmed when raised by gay couples.  But courts that looked closely 
at the evidence saw that the claim was spurious, and the Supreme 
Court implicitly agreed in its recent decision invalidating section 3 of 
the Defense of Marriage Act.  Abortion regulation is subject to the 
same disregard for facts.  Unless courts are willing to take a closer 
look at the factual premises states cite to justify these measures, fac-
tually unsupported abortion laws will continue to flourish.  The Su-
preme Court this year will likely review a Texas abortion restriction 
that purports to promote abortion patients’ safety but, far from doing 
so, has caused a dozen clinics to shut down.  If the Court takes up the 
issue, it should review the state’s alleged justifications for the law at 
least as closely as it does the plaintiffs’ proof of the law’s burdensome 
effects. 
Unfortunately, courts applying the undue burden standard estab-
lished in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992 have tended to focus 
mainly or exclusively on the effects of abortion restrictions, promoting 
judicial disregard for the facts underlying these laws.  The anti-
abortion-rights movement has pushed the envelope of the undue bur-
den standard, successfully pressing state legislatures to pass ever-more 
onerous measures, some of which threaten to, or already have, shut 
down abortion clinics.  The courts’ primary inquiry in reviewing these 
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laws is usually whether the restrictions have the effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions.  That 
question inevitably depends on variables including the number and 
distribution of providers in a given state, and individual judges’ views 
of what constitutes a “substantial obstacle.”  The undue burden stan-
dard has thus opened the door to a broad array of laws that affect how 
and whether women can access abortion.   
Meanwhile, another aspect of the undue burden standard has re-
mained essentially toothless.  The first prong of the test asks whether a 
law has the purpose of placing a substantial obstacle before women 
seeking abortions.  It’s hardly a secret that the anti-abortion-rights 
movement views restrictions such as parental involvement laws, wait-
ing periods, and clinic facility regulations as steps on the path to dis-
mantling the right to abortion entirely.  But to prove that this move-
ment goal amounts to an unconstitutional purpose behind a particular 
law has been virtually impossible.  For instance, in Mazurek v. 
Armstrong the Supreme Court upheld a law that permits only physi-
cians to perform abortions.  The Court rejected as insufficient to prove 
improper purpose the fact that an anti-abortion-rights group drafted 
the law, and that no evidence supported its patient-safety rationale. 
In addition to making it virtually impossible for challengers to 
prove an illegitimate purpose to the Court’s satisfaction, the Court has 
made it very easy for the state to demonstrate a valid purpose for the 
law.  In a 2007 decision, Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court ap-
plied a weak version of Casey’s “purpose prong” when it upheld the 
federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, requiring only that Congress 
have had a “rational basis to act.”  The Court’s far-fetched conclusion 
that the ban was justified because women might come to regret their 
abortions was notoriously — and self-admittedly —unconcerned with 
scientific support. 
But it is possible to smoke out illegitimate purposes indirectly.  If 
courts looked more skeptically at the factual foundations supposedly 
necessitating abortion laws, they would often discover those founda-
tions to be weak if not totally absent.  Whether this is because of legis-
lative insincerity, inattention, or bias is irrelevant.  Factually unsup-
ported laws that infringe constitutionally protected rights should not 
be allowed to stand.  Such a shortcoming infects an entire law and 
warrants its wholesale invalidation. 
The outcome of a constitutional challenge to legislation or other 
governmental action often turns on whether a court defers to or skep-
tically probes the state’s factual justifications.  This is true whether the 
court purports to apply strict scrutiny or a less stringent form of re-
view.  For example, in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Supreme Court 
recently applied “heightened scrutiny” in a First Amendment challenge 
to Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law, ruling in favor of a fa-
cial challenge to this commercial speech restriction.  The Court closely 
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examined the state’s justifications, including the need to protect medi-
cal privacy, avoid harassment, safeguard the integrity of the doctor-
patient relationship, improve public health, and reduce healthcare 
costs.  The Court rejected all of these, concluding that Vermont’s in-
terest “turns on nothing more than a difference of opinion” with phar-
maceutical marketers.  Similarly, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv-
ing Center, Inc., the Supreme Court invalidated the city’s refusal to 
grant a special use permit for a group home for the developmentally 
disabled.  The Court cited a lack of factual support for the city’s justi-
fications, even though the Court applied rational basis review. 
Judges may come to regret their decisions if they defer blindly to a 
state’s purported justifications for targeting constitutional rights while 
skeptically viewing plaintiffs’ predictions of harm.  The story of one 
renowned federal judge in an analogous context is instructive:  In 
2008, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to an Indiana voter iden-
tification requirement, even though the state produced no evidence of 
in-person voter impersonation fraud to support the need for the law.  
At the same time, the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ allegations that the 
law would hamper the right to vote.  In a recent book, Judge Posner, 
who had voted with the majority on the Seventh Circuit to uphold  
the law before the case reached the Supreme Court, admitted that he 
had made a mistake and that the requirement is “a type of law now 
widely regarded as a means of voter suppression rather than of fraud 
prevention.” 
As abortion restrictions have become ever more extreme in recent 
years, some federal courts reviewing these measures have begun to ex-
amine the legislatures’ stated justifications more closely, finding even 
under Gonzales’s “rational basis” approach that they lack sufficient 
factual support.  This has been particularly true in cases addressing 
requirements that abortion providers secure admitting privileges at 
nearby hospitals.  These laws purport to promote patients’ safety, even 
though such privileges are not required for comparable or even signifi-
cantly riskier out-patient procedures.  Their stated purpose is further 
called into question by the fact that they tend to result in clinic clo-
sures, because many hospitals refuse to grant the privileges.  After 
signing such a law in Mississippi, a state with a single abortion pro-
vider that has been unable to secure admitting privileges, Governor 
Bryant tellingly declared: “This is a historic day to begin the process of 
ending abortion in Mississippi.”  A federal court has preliminarily en-
joined the Mississippi law based on its predicted unconstitutional ef-
fects.  But other courts have looked beyond these laws’ effects to ex-
amine their purpose and factual justifications.  A Wisconsin federal 
district judge temporarily blocked a similar law after carefully review-
ing the evidence and concluding that the state was unlikely to prove 
the law is “reasonably related to maternal health.”  The Seventh Cir-
cuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, upheld the district court’s injunc-
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tion.  The court noted the absence of evidence in the legislative or 
judicial records to show that admitting privileges would improve pa-
tient safety and asserted that “the medical grounds thus far pre-
sented . . . are feeble.” 
A challenge to Texas’s admitting privileges requirement — which 
the Supreme Court will likely review later this year — demonstrates 
how outcomes can turn on whether a court defers to a state’s factual 
justifications or skeptically reviews them.  The Texas federal district 
court concluded, after a three-day trial, that “admitting privileges have 
no rational relationship to improved patient care.”  The Fifth Circuit 
panel, in contrast, credited the state’s assertions that the law promotes 
women’s health when it granted Texas an emergency, temporary stay 
of the district court’s injunction.  To support its departure from the 
trial court’s conclusion, the Fifth Circuit panel relied upon FCC v. 
Beach Communications, in which the Supreme Court asserted that “a 
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be 
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical 
data.” However, that case addressed an equal protection challenge that 
involved neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental constitu-
tional right.  Courts should require that the state put forward evidence 
supporting its factual claims, especially when important constitutional 
rights are at stake. 
Four decades after Roe v. Wade, abortion remains a controversial 
constitutional right.  Many state legislatures are eager to curb the pro-
cedure as much as possible.  It stands to reason that some legislators 
will promote abortion restrictions based on pretextual purposes.  It is 
also predictable that their zeal to harass abortion providers or restrict 
abortion access will overwhelm their interest in the real facts, or that 
even moderate legislators will be swayed by the biased factual asser-
tions of abortion opponents.  A standard that looks skeptically at 
plaintiffs’ fact-based predictions of harm, while smiling generously 
upon the state’s fact-based assertions of legislative need, has things 
backwards.  It is the courts’ job to protect unpopular constitutional 
rights from legislative encroachment.  They can only do this job well if 
they examine carefully the factual premises supposedly justifying bur-
densome abortion laws. 
